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1.	  Introduction	  The	  ways	  in	  which	  we	  exercise	   intentional	  agency	  are	  varied.	  I	   take	  the	  domain	  of	  intentional	   agency	   to	   include	   all	   that	   we	   intentionally	   do	   versus	   what	   merely	  happens	   to	  us.	   So	   the	   scope	  of	  our	   intentional	   agency	   is	  not	   limited	   to	   intentional	  action.	   One	   can	   also	   exercise	   some	   intentional	   agency	   in	   omitting	   to	   act	   and,	  importantly,	   in	  producing	   the	   intentional	   outcome	  of	   an	   intentional	   action.	   So,	   for	  instance,	  when	  an	  agent	  is	  dieting,	  there	  is	  an	  exercise	  of	  agency	  both	  with	  respect	  to	   the	   agent’s	   actions	   and	   omissions	   that	   constitute	   her	   dieting	   behavior	   and	   in	  achieving	  the	  intended	  outcome	  of	  losing	  weight.	  	  	  	   In	  our	  mental	  lives	  we	  exercise	  intentional	  agency	  both	  in	  performing	  mental	  actions	  and	  when	  we	   intentionally	  produce	  certain	  outcomes	  at	  which	  our	  mental	  actions	   are	   aimed.1	  The	  nature	   and	   scope	  of	   our	   intentional	   agency	   in	  our	  mental	  lives	   with	   respect	   to	   controlling	   the	   acquisition	   of	   mental	   states	   such	   as	   belief,	  desire,	  and	  intention	  is	  a	  topic	  that	  is	  of	  interest	  in	  its	  own	  right.	  	  In	  this	  essay,	  I	  will	  focus	  solely	  on	  our	  control	  over	  coming	  to	  believe.	  
                                                            
1 For more on mental action generally, see the essays in	  O’Brien	  and	  Soteriou	  2009.	  See	  also	  Buckareff	  2005	  and	  2007.	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Understanding	   what	   sort	   of	   control	   we	   have	   our	   beliefs	   has	   far-­‐reaching	  implications.	   For	   instance,	   theorizing	   about	   self-­‐deception	   and	  wishful	   thinking	   is	  aided	   by	   theorizing	   about	   what	   if	   any	   intentional	   agency	   we	   can	   exercise	   with	  respect	   to	   acquiring	   beliefs.	   Another	   often	   mentioned	   concern	   that	   motivates	  thinking	   about	   doxastic	   agency	   comes	   from	   religion	   (when	   conversion	   requires	   a	  change	   of	   belief).	  We	   also	   hold	   persons	  morally	   and	   epistemically	   responsible	   for	  beliefs	   they	  have	  or	   fail	   to	  have.2	  Finally,	  some	  deontological	   theories	  of	  epistemic	  justification	   require	   that	   agents	   be	   able	   to	   exercise	   a	   robust	   form	   of	   doxastic	  control.3	  Fruitful	  work	  on	  any	  of	  these	  problems	  requires	  that	  we	  have	  an	  account	  of	  our	  intentional	  agency	  in	  acquiring	  beliefs.	  	  There	   are	   at	   least	   three	   loci	   of	   doxastic	   control.	   The	   first	   is	   over	   acquiring	  beliefs.	   The	   second	   is	   over	  maintaining	   beliefs.	   The	   third	   is	   over	   how	  we	   use	   our	  beliefs.4	  I	  am	  chiefly	  concerned	  with	  the	  first	  locus	  of	  doxastic	  control	  in	  this	  essay,	  but	   I	   will	   say	   something	   about	   the	   second	   locus	   along	   the	   way.	   Also,	   I	   will	   only	  consider	   one	  way	  we	  might	   exercise	   control	   over	   acquiring	   beliefs.5	   Specifically,	   I	  will	   present	   an	   argument	   against	   direct	   doxastic	   voluntarism	   (DDV).	   By	   “DDV”	   I	  
                                                            2	  	  There	  are	  exceptions	  to	  the	  widespread	  view	  that	  ascriptions	  of	  epistemic	  responsibility	  are	  tied	  to	  the	  sort	  of	  doxastic	  control	  agents	  may	  exercise.	  For	  instance,	  David	  Owens	  argues	  that	  exercises	  of	  doxastic	   control	   are	   not	   subject	   to	   epistemic	   norms.	   	   Rather,	   “the	   norms	   of	   practical	   reason	  determine	  the	  rationality	  of	  the	  deed”	  (2000,	  82).	  	  Such	  control,	  he	  notes,	  “underwrites	  a	  conditional	  responsibility	  to	  conform	  our	  beliefs	  to	  epistemic	  norms	  when	  it	   is	  prudent	  (or	  morally	  obligatory)	  so	  to	  do”	  (2000,	  83).	  	  Things	  are	  no	  better,	  according	  to	  Owens,	  if	  the	  exercise	  of	  doxastic	  control	  is	  like	  the	  control	  exercised	  over	  basic	  actions.	  He	  writes	  that,	  “the	  truth	  or	  falsity	  of	  the	  claim	  that	  we	  can	   induce	   beliefs	   by	   means	   of	   basic	   acts	   has	   no	   significance	   for	   epistemology,	   internalist	   or	  otherwise”	  a	  bit	  strong	  (Owens	  2000,	  85).	  	  	  	  3Alston	   1989,	   Feldman	   2001,	   Ginet	   2001,	   Nottelmann	   2006,	   Ryan	   2003,	   Steup	   2000,	   and	   many	  others,	   motivate	   an	   examination	   of	   the	   tenability	   of	   versions	   of	   doxastic	   voluntarism	   solely	   by	  appealing	  to	  the	  debate	  over	  deontological	  conceptions	  of	  epistemic	  justification.	  	  4	  For	  discussion	  of	  the	  difference	  between	  the	  first	  and	  third	  loci,	  see	  Bishop	  2007,	  28-­‐41.	  	  	  5	   See	   Hieronymi	   2006	   for	   a	   useful	   discussion	   of	   different	   types	   of	   control	   we	   may	   exercise	   over	  mental	  states.	  I	  discuss	  some	  different	  varieties	  of	  doxastic	  control	  in	  Buckareff	  2004	  and	  2011.	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mean	  to	  refer	  to	  the	  thesis	  that	  it	  is	  conceptually	  possible	  for	  agents	  to	  consciously	  exercise	  the	  same	  sort	  of	  direct	  voluntary	  control	  over	  coming	  to	  acquire	  a	  doxastic	  attitude—such	  as	  belief,	  suspension	  of	  belief,	  and	  disbelief—that	  they	  exercise	  over	  uncontroversial	   basic	   actions.	   If	   DDV	   is	   correct,	   then	   coming	   to	   believe	   can	   be	   a	  basic	  action-­‐type.	  DDV,	  or	  something	  very	  close	  to	  it,	  was	  Bernard	  Williams’	  target	  in	  his	  1973	  paper,	  “Deciding	  to	  Believe.”	  Williams’s	  argument	  is	  widely	  regarded	  as	  having	  been	  a	  failure.	  But	  I	  think	  that	  Williams	  was	  on	  to	  something	  in	  his	  paper.	  Hence,	  in	  this	  paper,	   while	   I	   do	   not	   attempt	   to	   resurrect	   Williams’s	   argument,	   I	   develop	   and	  defend	  a	  revised	  argument	  for	  a	  thesis	  that	  is	  quite	  close	  to	  Williams’s.	  	  I	  will	  proceed	  as	  follows.	  First,	  I	  will	  discuss	  Bernard	  Williams’	  (1973)	  failed	  attempt	  at	  showing	  that	  DDV	  is	  conceptually	  impossible.	  This	  will	  be	  followed	  by	  a	  discussion	  of	  some	  constraints	  on	  our	  belief-­‐forming	  activities.	  I	  will	  then	  clarify	  my	  target	  a	  bit	  more	  than	  Williams	  does	  in	  his	  original	  paper.	  Finally,	  I	  will	  present	  my	  own	  argument	  against	  the	  conceptual	  possibility	  of	  DDV.	  	  
	  
2.	  A	  Failed	  Argument	   	  As	  I	  mentioned	  in	  the	  introduction,	  the	  core	  of	  the	  debate	  over	  DDV	  with	  which	  I	  am	  interested	   in	   this	   paper	   has	   been	   over	  whether	   it	   is	   conceptually	   possible	   for	   an	  agent	   to	   decide	   to	   believe	   that	   p	   and	   come	   to	   believe	   as	   a	   direct	   result	   of	   the	  intention	  formed	  by	  making	  a	  decision—i.e.,	  “at	  will.”6	  Differently	  stated,	  the	  debate	  
                                                            6	   See	  Bernard	  Williams	  1973,	   Brian	  O’Shaugnessy	   1980,	   and	  Dion	   Scott-­‐Kakures	   1994	   for	   seminal	  essays	  arguing	  against	  the	  conceptual	  possibility	  of	  direct	  doxastic	  voluntarism.	   	  See	  Bennett	  1990,	  Funkhouser	  2003,	  Govier	  1975,	  Pieper	  1997,	  and	  Winters	  1979	  for	  critiques	  of	  Williams’s	  argument.	  For	  a	  critical	  response	  to	  O’Shaugnessy,	  see	  Scott-­‐Kakures	  1994,	  81-­‐83.	  	  For	  a	  reply	  to	  Scott-­‐Kakures,	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has	  been	  over	  whether	  it	  is	  conceptually	  possible	  for	  us	  to	  exercise	  the	  same	  sort	  of	  control	   over	   coming	   to	   believe	   that	   we	   exercise	   over	   basic	   intentional	   actions,	  where	  a	  basic	  action	   is	  an	  action	   that	   is	  not	  done	  by	  doing	  anything	  else.7	  That	   is,	  philosophers	  have	  been	  concerned	  with	  whether	  coming	   to	  believe	  can	  be	  a	  basic	  action-­‐type	  in	  its	  own	  right	  (Winters	  1979,	  243-­‐244).	  	  Most	   importantly,	   the	   debate	   has	   been	   over	   whether	   it	   is	   conceptually	  possible	   for	   one	   to	   exercise	   basic	   voluntary	   control	  while	   lacking	  any	   concern	   for	  the	   epistemic	   reasons	   that	   favor	   p	   in	   deciding	   to	   believe	   that	  p.	   Barbara	  Winters	  writes	  regarding	  this	  condition	  as	  follows.	  This	   condition	   is	   necessary	   because	   the	   philosophical	   controversy	   about	  belief	  at	  will	  concerns	  whether	  the	  model	  of	  free	  basic	  action	  can	  be	  applied	  to	  belief	  acquisition.	  If	  I	  were	  free	  to	  hold	  any	  belief	  I	  chose,	  I	  could	  decide	  to	  acquire	  only	  beliefs	  which	  were	  held	  by	  my	  peers	  or	  which	  I	  found	  pleasing.	  	  I	  might	  even	  select	  my	  beliefs	  randomly.	  The	  salient	  point	  is	  that	  the	  issue	  of	  a	   proposition’s	   truth	   or	   falsity	   does	   not	   play	   any	   role	   in	   my	   deliberations	  about	  whether	  or	  not	  to	  believe	   it;	   to	  answer	  the	  question,	  Should	  I	  believe	  that	  p	  is	  true?	  	  I	  do	  not	  ask,	  Is	  p	  true?	  (1979,	  244,	  emphasis	  added)	  I	  take	  it	  this	  means	  that	  the	  relevant	  question	  in	  debates	  over	  DDV	  is	  over	  whether	  coming	  to	  believe	  can	  be	  a	  basic	  action	  that	  occurs	  in	  response	  to	  practical	  reasons	  
                                                                                                                                                                                 see	  Radcliffe	  1997.	  	  Finally,	  Adler	  2002,	  Church	  2002,	  Clarke	  1986,	  Frankish	  2007,	  Pojman	  1985,	  and	  Setiya	  2008	  also	  offer	  arguments	  for	  the	  conceptual	  impossibility	  of	  direct	  doxastic	  voluntarism.	  	  7	   The	   locus	   classicus	   for	   a	   defense	   of	   the	   distinction	   between	   basic	   and	   non-­‐basic	   actions	   is	  Danto	  1965.	   It	  may	  be	  argued	   that	  deciding	   is	  a	  basic	  action.	  This	   is	  not	  obviously	   the	  case.	   If	   the	  goal	  of	  deciding	  is	  to	  settle	  on	  what	  to	  do	  in	  cases	  of	  practical	  uncertainty	  (see	  Mele	  2003),	  then	  an	  agent	  has	  achieved	   her	   goal	   once	   she	   has	   settled	   on	   A-­‐ing	   rather	   than	   not-­‐A-­‐ing	   and	   hence	   acquired	   an	  intention	   to	   A.	   What	   follows	   from	   the	   intention	   would	   be	   a	   basic	   action	   since	   it	   is	   not	   done	   by	  anything	  else	  even	  if	  caused	  by	  the	  intention.	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rather	  than	  epistemic	  reasons.8	  Any	  putative	  defense	  of	  a	  version	  of	  DDV	  that	  relies	  on	  an	  account	  of	  doxastic	  agency	  being	  exercised	  in	  response	  to	  epistemic	  reasons	  and/or	   does	   not	   treat	   the	   sort	   of	   doxastic	   control	   as	   basic	   voluntary	   control	   is	   a	  defense	  of	  an	  entirely	  different	   thesis.	  Hence,	  such	  theories	  can	  be	   ignored	   for	   the	  purposes	  of	  this	  paper	  since	  their	  defenders	  are	  focusing	  on	  a	  different	  thesis	  about	  doxastic	  agency	  than	  the	  one	  with	  which	  I	  am	  concerned	  in	  this	  paper.9	  Bernard	  Williams	  famously	  argued,	  in	  “Deciding	  to	  Believe”	  (1973),	  that	  the	  truth-­‐directedness	  of	  belief	  makes	  it	  conceptually	  impossible	  for	  us	  to	  exercise	  the	  relevant	  sort	  of	  doxastic	  control	  at	  issue	  in	  the	  debate	  over	  DDV.	  It	  is	  worth	  quoting	  Williams	  at	  some	  length.	  [I]t	   is	  not	  a	  contingent	   fact	   that	   I	   cannot	  bring	   it	  about,	   just	   like	   that,	   that	   I	  believe	  something,	  as	  it	   is	  a	  contingent	  fact	  that	  I	  cannot	  bring	  it	  about,	   just	  like	   that,	   that	   I’m	   blushing.	  Why	   is	   this?	   One	   reason	   is	   connected	  with	   the	  characteristic	   of	   beliefs	   that	   they	   aim	  at	   truth.	   If	   I	   could	   acquire	   a	   belief	   at	  will,	   I	   could	  acquire	   it	  whether	   it	  was	   true	  or	  not;	  moreover	   I	  would	  know	  that	   I	   could	   acquire	   it	  whether	   it	  was	   true	  or	  not.	   If	   in	   full	   consciousness	   I	  could	  will	  to	  acquire	  a	  ‘belief’	  irrespective	  of	  its	  truth,	  it	  is	  unclear	  that	  before	  the	  event	  I	  could	  seriously	  think	  of	  it	  as	  a	  belief,	  i.e.	  as	  something	  purporting	  to	  represent	  reality.	  At	  the	  very	  least,	  there	  must	  be	  a	  restriction	  on	  what	  is	  the	  case	  after	  the	  event;	  since	  I	  could	  not	  then,	  in	  full	  consciousness,	  regard	  this	  as	  a	  belief	  of	  mine,	  i.e.	  something	  I	  take	  to	  be	  true,	  and	  also	  know	  that	  I	  
                                                            8	  See	  Bennett	  1990,	  90	  and	  Audi	  2001,	  100-­‐104.	  9	  So	  the	  varieties	  of	  doxastic	  voluntarism	  defended	  in	  McCormick	  2011,	  McHugh	  forthcoming,	  Ryan	  2003,	   Steup	   2000	   and	   2008,	   to	   the	   extent	   that	   they	   can	   be	   characterized	   as	   defenses	   of	   direct	  doxastic	   voluntarism,	   are	   providing	   defenses	   of	   far	   more	   modest	   variants	   of	   direct	   doxastic	  voluntarism	  than	  the	  version	  with	  which	  I	  am	  concerned	  in	  this	  essay.	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acquired	  it	  at	  will.	  With	  regard	  to	  no	  belief	  could	  I	  know—or,	  if	  all	  this	  is	  to	  be	   done	   in	   full	   consciousness,	   even	   suspect—that	   I	   had	   acquired	   it	   at	  will.	  	  But	  if	  I	  can	  acquire	  beliefs	  at	  will,	  I	  must	  know	  that	  I	  am	  able	  to	  do	  this;	  and	  could	  I	  know	  that	  I	  was	  capable	  of	  this	  feat,	  if	  with	  regard	  to	  every	  feat	  of	  this	  kind	  which	  I	  had	  performed	  I	  necessarily	  had	  to	  believe	  that	  it	  had	  not	  taken	  place?	  (1973,	  148)	  This	   argument	   captures	   intuitions	   some	   philosophers	   have	   about	   the	   conceptual	  impossibility	   of	   exercising	   direct	   voluntary	   control	   over	   belief	   in	   response	   to	   an	  intention	   formed	  by	  an	  act	  of	  deciding	   to	  believe	   for	  practical	   reasons.	   	  But	   it	   has	  been	  widely	  regarded	  as	  unsuccessful.	  Barbara	   Winters	   (1979)	   offered	   one	   of	   the	   most	   formidable	   critiques	   of	  Williams’	  argument.	  Many	  other	  criticisms	  have	  followed	  similar	  lines	  of	  reasoning	  against	  Williams.10	   I	  will	   focus	  on	  Winters’	   case	  given	   that	  her	  argument	   is	  one	  of	  the	  best	  known	  and	  is	  often	  cited.	  	   Winters	  claims	  that	  with	  a	  few	  alterations,	  the	  following	  argument	  emerges	  from	  the	  above	  quoted	  paragraph	  from	  Williams	  (1979,	  252-­‐53).	  
1. Necessarily,	  if	  I	  acquire	  a	  belief	  at	  will,	  then	  I	  will	  in	  full	  consciousness	  to	  acquire	  it	  irrespective	  of	  its	  truth.	  
2. Necessarily,	  if	  in	  full	  consciousness	  I	  will	  to	  acquire	  a	  belief	  irrespective	  of	  its	  truth,	  then	  after	  the	  event	  it	   is	   impossible	  that	  I	   in	  full	  consciousness	  regard	  it	  as	  a	  belief	  of	  mine	  and	  also	  believe	  that	  I	  acquired	  it	  at	  will.	  
                                                            10	   See	   Bennett	   1990,	   Funkhouser	   2003,	   Govier	   1975,	   and	   Pieper	   1997	   for	   additional	   arguments	  against	  Williams.	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3. Therefore,	  with	  regard	  to	  no	  belief	  could	  I	  believe	  that	  I	  had	  acquired	  it	  at	  will.	  
4. If,	  with	  respect	  to	  every	  acquisition	  of	  a	  belief	  at	  will	  I	  had	  performed,	  it	  is	  necessary	  that	  I	  not	  believe	  it	  took	  place,	  then	  I	  could	  not	  know	  that	  I	  was	  able	  to	  acquire	  beliefs	  at	  will.	  
5. Therefore,	  I	  cannot	  know	  that	  I	  am	  able	  to	  acquire	  beliefs	  at	  will.	  
6. If	   I	   can	   acquire	   beliefs	   at	   will,	   I	   must	   know	   that	   I	   am	   able	   to	   acquire	  beliefs	  at	  will.	  
7. Therefore,	  I	  cannot	  acquire	  beliefs	  at	  will.	  Winters	  claims	  that	  the	  problems	  with	  Williams’	  argument	  lie	  with	  (2),	  (4),	  and	  (6).	  	  Because	  of	  the	  troubles,	  Williams’	  argument	  is	  not	  sound.	  	   Regarding	  (2),	  Winters	  claims	  that	  it	  is	  too	  strong.	  (2)	  can	  be	  contrasted	  with	  a	  weaker	  principle	  that	  I	  call	  “SW”	  for	  “sustained	  at	  will”	  (1979,	  253)11:	  (SW)	   Necessarily,	   it	   is	   not	   the	   case	   that	   someone	   believes	   in	   full	  consciousness	   that	   she	   believes	   that	   p	   and	   that	   her	   belief	   that	   p	   is	  sustained	  at	  will.	  Winters	  notes	   that	   “(2)	   substitutes	   ‘acquired	  at	  will’	   for	   [SW’s]	   ‘sustained	  at	  will’”	  (1979,	   253).	   Winters	   claims	   that	   since	   a	   belief	   can	   be	   maintained	   for	   reasons	  different	  from	  those	  involved	  in	  its	  acquisition	  it	   is	  possible	  that	  one	  could	  believe	  that	  some	  belief	  was	  acquired	  at	  will	  so	  long	  as	  one	  no	  longer	  believes	  that	  the	  belief	  is	  sustained	  at	  will.	   	  For	   instance,	  one	  may	  now	  have	  evidence	   for	   the	   truth	  of	   the	  proposition	   believed	   (1979,	   253).	   Winters	   notes	   that,	   “These	   possibilities	   are	  
                                                            11	  SW	  appears	  as	  follows	  in	  Winters	  1979:	  “Necessarily,	  ~(∃x)(∃p)	  (x	  believes	  in	  full	  consciousness	  ⎡x	  believes	  p	  &	  x’s	  belief	  of	  [sic.]	  p	  is	  sustained	  at	  will⎤)”	  (253).	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incompatible	  with	   (3),	  which	  claims	   that	   there	  could	  be	  no	  belief	  of	  mine	   [past	  or	  present,	   as	   the	   antecedent	   of	   (4)	   clarifies]	   that	   I	   could	   regard	   as	   having	   been	  acquired	   at	   will”	   (1979,	   253).12	   According	   to	  Winters,	   the	   failure	   to	   establish	   (3)	  because	   of	   troubles	   with	   (2)	   suffices	   to	   undermine	   Williams’	   argument	   for	   the	  conceptual	  impossibility	  of	  exercising	  direct	  voluntary	  control	  over	  belief.	  	  	   (4)	   and	   (6)	   are	  worth	   considering	   in	   the	   interest	   of	   assessing	  whether	   the	  rest	  of	  the	  argument	  would	  have	  been	  successful	   if	  (2)	  had	  been	  better	  supported.	  According	  to	  Winters,	  (4)	  claims	  that	  if	  in	  any	  instance	  it	  is	  necessarily	  false	  that	  an	  agent	  believes	  she	  has	  exercised	  the	  ability	  to	  believe	  at	  will,	  then	  an	  agent	  cannot	  have	   knowledge	   of	   having	   such	   an	   ability.	   Winters	   notes	   that	  Williams	   seems	   to	  assume	   that	   (4)	   follows	   from	   believing	   at	   will	   being	   an	   ability	   one	   necessarily	  cannot	  know	  one	  has	  exercised.	  She	  claims	  that	  such	  a	  principle	  is	  false	  because	  “I	  can	  become	  aware	  of	  capacities	  I	  have	  as	  a	  result	  of	  extrapolation	  from	  other	  data	  I	  have	   about	   myself	   or	   through	   the	   reliable	   testimony	   of	   others”	   (1979,	   254).	  	  Furthermore,	  even	  if	  one	  is	  never	  aware	  of	  having	  believed	  at	  will,	  one	  could	  know	  one	  has	  the	  ability	  to	  believe	  at	  will	  from	  observing	  others	  coming	  to	  believe	  at	  will,	  and	  by	  having	  others	  report	  when	  one	  does	  it	  (Winters	  1979,	  255).	  	   Finally,	   regarding	   (6),	   Winters	   notes	   that,	   “In	   (6)	   Williams	   maintains	   that	  having	   the	   ability	   to	   acquire	   beliefs	   at	   will	   requires	   awareness	   of	   its	   possession”	  (1979,	  255).	  She	  takes	   it	   that	  the	  salient	   feature	  of	  believing	  at	  will	   that	  motivates	  (6)	  may	  be	  the	  requirement	  that	  believing	  at	  will	  be	  a	  basic	  action	  performed	  in	  full	  consciousness.	  But	  she	  adds	  that,	  even	  if	  this	  is	  the	  case,	  it	  does	  not	  follow	  that	  one	  
                                                            12	  The	  bracketed	  material	  is	  in	  the	  original.	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must	  be	  aware	  of	  having	  this	  ability	  if	  one	  can	  acquire	  beliefs	  at	  will.	  One	  may	  want	  to	  believe	  that	  p	  and	  not	  be	  aware	  of	  one’s	  wanting	  to	  believe	  and	  similarly	  acquire	  an	  intention	  that	  causes	  one	  to	  believe.	  Upon	  introspection,	  one	  may	  become	  aware	  of	   epistemic	   reasons	   for	   believing.	   But	   it	   was	   one’s	   ability	   to	   believe	   at	   will	   that	  caused	  one	  to	  come	  to	  believe,	  even	  if	  one’s	  epistemic	  reasons	  are	  sufficient	  to	  now	  fully	   explain	   why	   one	   continues	   to	   have	   the	   belief	   after	   it	   is	   acquired	   at	   will.	   So	  having	  an	  ability	  does	  not	  require	  that	  one	  be	  aware	  of	  one’s	  ability.	  The	  upshot	  is	  that	  because	  of	  problems	  with	  (4)	  and	  (6)	  the	  transition	  between	  (3)	  and	  (7)	  fails.	  Further	  considerations	  Winters	  entertains	  are	  not	  relevant	  for	  my	  purposes	  here,	  so	  I	  ignore	  them	  in	  the	  interest	  of	  being	  succinct.	  	   Winters’	   argument	   against	   Williams’	   argument	   for	   the	   conceptual	  impossibility	   of	   believing	   at	  will	   is	  widely	   regarded	   as	   a	   success.	   I	   do	   have	   some	  worries	  about	  Winters	  apparently	  being	  committed	   to	   the	  view	   that	  one	  can	  have	  the	  ability	  to	  perform	  a	  certain	  type	  of	  action,	  yet	  never	  be	  aware	  of	  manifesting	  that	  ability	  when	  acting.	  The	  intentional	  exercise	  of	  an	  ability	  would	  seem	  to	  require	  that	  one	  can	  be	  and	  has	  been	  aware	  of	  the	  general	  ability	  in	  question.	  But	  I	  will	  not	  focus	  on	  this	  point	  in	  this	  paper.	  	  	  Many	  of	  the	  other	  critiques	  of	  Williams’	  argument	  are	  similarly	  regarded	  as	  having	   shown	   that	   Williams	   did	   not	   show	   that	   it	   is	   conceptually	   impossible	   to	  believe	   at	   will.	   It	   does	   not	   follow	   from	   the	   success	   of	   critiques	   of	   Williams’	  argument,	  however,	  that	  we	  must	  accept	  that	  it	  is	  at	  least	  conceptually	  possible	  that	  we	  can	  exercise	  direct	  voluntary	  control	  over	  coming	  to	  believe.	  In	  the	  remainder	  of	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this	  essay,	  I	  offer	  and	  defend	  an	  argument	  I	  believe	  is	  impervious	  to	  criticisms	  such	  as	  those	  Winters	  and	  others	  level	  against	  Williams.	  	  	  
	  
3.	  Belief,	  Truth,	  and	  Reasons	  In	  what	  follows,	  following	  Williams,	  I	  assume	  there	  is	  a	  meaningful	  sense	  in	  which	  correct	  belief	  aims	  at	  truth	  or	  conformity	  to	  truth.	  There	  are	  at	  least	  two	  features	  of	  belief	  that	  are	  often	  discussed	  that	  are	  related	  to	  the	  truth-­‐directedness	  of	  belief.	  	  	  I	  discuss	  both	  of	  these	  in	  this	  section	  along	  with	  another	  feature	  that	  is	  closely	  related	  to	   the	   first	   two	   characteristics.	   Together,	   these	   features	   will	   place	   constraints	   on	  how	  we	  acquire	  our	  beliefs.	  	  First,	  a	  propositional	  attitude	  is	  a	  belief	  if	  it	  represents	  its	  content	  as	  true	  in	  a	  way	   that	   other	   propositional	   attitudes	   (including	   other	   cognitive	   states)	   do	   not.	  	  This	  may	  be	  due	  in	  part	  to	  the	  so-­‐called	  direction	  of	  fit	  of	  belief.	  	  Belief	  has	  a	  mind-­‐to-­‐
world	  direction	  of	   fit,	   the	  mind	  conforming	   itself	   to	   the	  world	  as	   it	   is	  presented	  to	  the	  agent;	  conative	  states,	  like	  desire	  and	  intention,	  have	  a	  world-­‐to-­‐mind	  direction	  of	  fit,	  the	  functional	  role	  of	  such	  attitudes	  would	  include	  the	  conformity	  of	  the	  world	  to	  the	  mind.13	  	  	  	   	   The	  second	  characteristic	  of	  belief	  related	  to	  its	  truth-­‐directedness	  has	  to	  do	  with	  what	  counts	  as	  a	  reason	  for	  belief.	  	  Reasons	  for	  believing	  that	  p	  (and	  not	  merely	  motivational	   and	   explanatory	   reasons	  why	   a	   belief	   that	   p	   is	  worth	   acquiring/was	  acquired)	  are	   truth-­‐conducive	   reasons—i.e.,	   broadly,	   considerations	   that	   favor	   the	  truth	  of	  p.	   	  Regarding	  this	  second	  feature,	  it	  is	  reasonable	  to	  assume	  that	  epistemic	  reasons	   differ	   from	   broadly	   practical	   reasons	   insofar	   as	   epistemic	   reasons	   bear	  
                                                            13	  See	  Anscombe	  1963/2000,	  Searle	  1983,	  and	  Velleman	  2000	  for	  more	  on	  direction	  of	  fit.	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directly	  on	  the	  truth	  of	  p	  and	  count	  in	  favor	  of	  the	  truth	  of	  p.	  Practical	  reasons	  do	  not	  bear	  directly	  on	  the	  truth	  of	  p	  and	  do	  not	  count	  in	  favor	  of	  the	  truth	  of	  p,	  but	  they	  may	  count	  in	  favor	  of	  treating	  p	  as	  true	  (see	  Shah	  2006).	  	  	  	  	   	   Third,	  from	  the	  first-­‐person	  perspective,	  the	  question,	  “Do	  I	  believe	  that	  p?”	  is	  indistinguishable	   from	   the	   question	   “Is	   it	   true	   that	  p?”	   (see	   Edgely	   1969;	   cf.	   Shah	  2003).	  If	  I	  answer	  that	  it	  is	  not	  true	  that	  p,	  then	  I	  am	  not	  in	  a	  good	  position	  to	  answer	  honestly	  that	  I	  believe	  that	  p.	  	  	   Going	   further,	   if	   the	   last	   claim	   about	   the	   transparency	   of	   belief	   is	   correct,	  then	  we	  have	  a	  toehold	  for	  the	  following	  further	  claim.	   	  If	  an	  agent	  believes	  that	  p,	  then	  she	  is	  disposed	  to	  believe	  there	  is	  some	  evidence	  for	  p.	  This	  is	  not	  to	  say	  that	  the	   transparency	   thesis	   entails	   that	   to	   believe	   that	   p	   is	   to	   believe	   there	   is	   some	  evidence	  for	  p.	  	  And	  I	  am	  not	  claiming	  that	  an	  agent	  who	  believes	  that	  p	  actually	  has	  adequate	  evidence	  for	  p.	  	  I	  am	  only	  claiming	  that	  an	  agent	  who	  believes	  that	  p	  would	  be	  disposed	  to	  take	  it	  to	  be	  the	  case	  that	  there	  are	  considerations	  that	  count	  in	  favor	  of	  the	  truth	  of	  p.	  	  	   Features	  of	  belief	  suggest	   that	  this	   last	  claim	  is	   justified.	   	  Recall	  what	   I	  said	  about	  the	  direction	  of	  fit	  of	  beliefs	  from	  mind-­‐to-­‐world.	  	  In	  believing	  that	  p	  an	  agent	  takes	  an	  attitude	  toward	  p	  that	  conforms	  to	  how	  the	  world	   is	  presented	  to	  her.	   	   If	  the	  agent’s	  attitude	  conforms	  to	  the	  way	  she	  takes	  the	  world	  to	  be	  presenting	  itself,	  then	  the	  considerations	  she	  acquires	  her	  attitude	  in	  response	  to	  are	  her	  reasons	  for	  believing	   that	  p.	   	   If	   this	   is	   right,	   then	   reasons	   for	   believing	   that	  p	  are	   reasons	   for	  holding	  that	  it	  is	  the	  case	  that	  p.	  	  And	  any	  reasons	  for	  holding	  that	  it	  is	  the	  case	  that	  p	  would	  be	  considerations	  that	  count	  for	  the	  truth	  of	  p	  and,	  hence,	  are	  evidence	  for	  p.	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Of	   course,	   human	   agents	   are	   so	   constituted	   that	   non-­‐epistemic	   reasons	   or	   other	  influences	  may	  actually	  play	  a	  role	  in	  explaining	  why	  an	  agent	  believes	  as	  she	  does.	  This	  is	  the	  case	  if	  the	  agent’s	  assessment	  of	  her	  evidence	  is	  biased	  or	  rendered	  more	  salient	  by	  her	  motivational	  states	  (which	  are	  non-­‐epistemic	  reasons)	  at	  the	  time	  she	  evaluates	  her	  reasons	  for	  belief	  (as	  in	  textbook	  cases	  of	  “straight”	  self-­‐deception).14	  But	   this	   does	   not	  mean	   that	   from	   an	   agent’s	   conscious	   first-­‐person	   perspective	   a	  belief	  could	  somehow	  be	  acquired	  in	  response	  to	  non-­‐epistemic	  reasons	  (or	  that	  it	  could	  be	  sustained	  upon	  introspection).	  	  	   From	   this	  we	   get	   a	   constraint	   on	   belief.	   	   In	   order	   for	   an	   agent	   to	   sustain	   a	  belief	   that	  p,	   she	   should	   be	   able	   to	   identify	   some	   evidence	   for	   the	   truth	   of	  p	   (see	  Jones	   2002,	   2004).	   I	   take	   it	   this	   constraint	   on	   belief	   is	   effective	   upon	   an	   agent’s	  becoming	   aware	   that	   she	   believes	   that	   p.	   If	   she	   does	   not	   identify	   any	   evidence,	  continuing	  to	  believe	  will	  become	  impossible	  (or	  at	  least	  very	  difficult).	   	  For	  failing	  to	   identify	  evidence	  places	   the	  agent	   in	   the	  position	  of	  believing	  that	  p	   is	   true	  and	  being	   disposed	   to	   assert	   that	   it	   is	   the	   case	   that	   p	   while	   simultaneously	   both	  recognizing	  that	  there	  are	  no	  epistemic	  reasons	  to	  believe	  that	  p	  and	  also	  disposed	  to	  assert	  that	  there	  is	  no	  reason	  to	  believe	  that	  p.	  	  	  
                                                            14	   There	   is	   psychological	   evidence	   that	   non-­‐epistemic	   reasons	   often	   make	   evidence	   for	   the	  proposition	  an	  agent	  comes	  to	  believe	  more	  salient,	  causing	  the	  agent	  to	  acquire	  a	  belief	  in	  response	  to	  her	  putative	  epistemic	  reasons.	  For	  recent	  accessible	  treatments	  of	  the	  nature	  of	  both	  motivated	  and	  unmotivated	  biased	  belief,	  and	  the	  way	  heuristics	   in	  unbiased	  belief	  affect	  beliefs	   in	  ways	   that	  suggest	  that	  even	  beliefs	  acquired	  in	  the	  face	  of	  contrary	  evidence	  nonetheless	  seem	  to	  be	  shaped	  by	  evidence	   (because	  of	  motivated	  or	   cold	  biasing),	   see	  Mele	  2001,	   ch.	  2;	   and	  Nisbett	   and	  Ross	  1980.	  Such	  shaping	  of	  belief	  by	  evidence,	  along	  with	  belief’s	  being	  truth-­‐	  directed	  is	  even	  evident	  in	  cases	  of	  persons	  who	  suffer	   from	  conditions	  such	  as	  Capgras	  delusion	  –	   the	  chief	  symptom	  of	  which	   is	   that	  sufferers	   believe	   that	   one	   or	   more	   close	   relatives	   have	   been	   replaced	   by	   an	   impostor.	   For	   a	  fascinating	   discussion	   of	   delusional	   beliefs	   that	   suggests	   that	   such	   beliefs,	   even	   when	   they	   fail	   to	  cohere	  with	  an	  agent’s	  related	  beliefs,	  aim	  at	  truth	  and	  are	  shaped	  by	  evidence,	  see	  Stone	  and	  Young	  1997,	  pp.	  327–364.	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The	   transparency	   of	   belief	   has	   consequences	   for	   acquiring	   beliefs	   as	   well.	  From	   the	   standpoint	   of	   conscious	   first-­‐person	   doxastic	   deliberation,	   deliberating	  about	   whether	   to	   believe	   that	   p	   must	   include	   considering	   whether	   p	   is	   true	   and	  reasons	   for	   the	   truth	   of	   p.	   Admittedly,	   one	   may	   engage	   in	   practical	   deliberation	  about	  bringing	  it	  about	  that	  one	  comes	  to	  believe	  that	  p,	  considering	  non-­‐epistemic	  reasons	  that	  favor	  believing	  that	  p.	  	  But	  such	  practical	  reasoning	  aimed	  at	  bringing	  it	  about	   that	   one	   comes	   to	   believe	   that	  p	   is	   different	   from	  what	   one	   is	   doing	  when	  engaging	  in	  doxastic	  deliberation.	  	  	  	  Nishi	   Shah	   contends	   that	   from	   the	   first-­‐person	   doxastic	   deliberative	  standpoint	   “the	   question	   whether	   to	   believe	   that	   p	   seems	   to	   collapse	   into	   the	  question	  whether	  p	   is	   true”	   (2003,	  p.	  447;	  see	  also	  Shah	  2006).	   	  He	  writes	   that,	   “A	  corollary	  to	  this	  hypothesis	  is	  that	  reasons	  for	  an	  affirmative	  answer	  to	  the	  question	  
whether	   to	  believe	   that	  p	  must	  be	   considerations	   that	   are	   taken	  as	   relevant	  of	   the	  truth	  of	  p”(2003,	  449).	  	  Shah	  argues	  that	  it	  is	  not	  merely	  a	  psychological	  fact	  about	  human	  agents	  that	  there	  is	  a	  “seamless	  shift	  in	  focus	  from	  belief	  to	  truth.”	  He	  asserts	  that	  it	  is	  “something	  demanded	  by	  the	  nature	  of	  first-­‐personal	  doxastic	  deliberation”	  (2003,	   447).	   	   Given	   this	   feature	   of	   doxastic	   deliberation	   from	   the	   first-­‐person	  standpoint,	   if	   an	   agent	   is	   considering	   whether	   to	   believe	   that	   p,	   then	   she	   is	  considering	   whether	   p	   is	   true.	   Thus,	   if	   an	   agent	   is	   in	   a	   position	   to	   answer	  affirmatively	  to	  either	  the	  question	  whether	  to	  believe	  that	  p	  or	  whether	  p	   is	   true,	  then	  she	  must	   take	  herself	   to	  have	  some	  evidence	   for	   the	   truth	  of	  p	   and	  she	  must	  regard	  her	  belief	  that	  p	  as	  based	  on	  her	  relevant	  putative	  evidence.	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It	  may	  be	  argued	  at	  this	  point	  that	  what	  I	  am	  claiming	  about	  belief	  acquisition	  cannot	  be	  correct.	  What	  about	  acquiring	  beliefs	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  a	  hunch?	  Certainly	  a	  hunch	  is	  not	  evidence.	  So	  what	  I	  am	  claiming	  about	  evidence	  and	  belief-­‐acquisition	  cannot	  be	  right.15	  	  I	   do	   not	  wish	   to	   claim	   that	   a	   hunch	   really	   is	   evidence	   or	   that	   it	   can	   never	  count	  as	  evidence.	  But	  if	  an	  agent	  can	  successfully	  acquire	  a	  belief	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  a	  hunch,	   then	   I	   take	   it	   that	   the	   agent	   regards	   her	   hunch	   as	   having	   evidential	   value	  (most	   likely	   more	   evidential	   value	   than	   it	   actually	   has).	   This	   may	   occur	   in	   cases	  where	  someone	  is	  credulous.	  Someone	  who	  is	  more	  skeptical	  may	  afford	  a	  hunch	  no	  evidential	   value	   at	   all.	   Another	   case	   where	   a	   hunch	   may	   be	   taken	   to	   have	   more	  evidential	  value	  than	  it	  really	  has	  would	  be	  a	  case	  of	  motivated	  belief.	  Suppose	  that	  in	  such	  a	  case	  what	  is	  believed	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  a	  hunch	  is	  something	  the	  agent	  wants	  to	  be	   true.	  The	  hunch,	   accordingly,	   is	   assigned	   evidential	   value	   that	   it	  may	   in	   fact	  lack.	  What	  matters	  is	  that	  the	  agent	  takes	  the	  hunch	  to	  count	  in	  favor	  of	  the	  truth	  of	  
p.	   But	   if	   a	   hunch	   is	   taken	   to	   lack	   any	   evidential	   value	   by	   an	   agent,	   then	   honest	  reflection	   on	  whether	   to	   believe	   that	   p	   on	   the	   basis	   of	   the	   hunch	  will	   result	   in	   a	  failed	  attempt	  at	  coming	  to	  believe	  that	  p.	  	  I	   am	   sure	   there	   are	   more	   objections	   that	   can	   be	   raised	   to	   what	   I	   have	  asserted	  in	  this	  section.	  For	  now,	  however,	  I	  will	  simply	  take	  it	  for	  granted	  that	  the	  claims	  I	  have	  made	  about	  constraints	  on	  belief	  are	  at	  least	  prima	  facie	  plausible.	  	  
	  
4.	  Contra	  DDV	  
                                                            15	  This	  objection	  was	  raised	  by	  Rico	  Vitz.	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In	   this	   section,	   I	   argue	   against	   the	   conceptual	   possibility	   of	   exercising	   direct	  voluntary	  control	  over	  coming	  to	  believe	  by	  simply	  deciding	  to	  believe	  for	  practical	  reasons	   alone.16	   More	   specifically,	   I	   shall	   argue	   that	   an	   agent	   cannot	   consciously	  exercise	  such	  control	  over	  coming	  to	  believe.	  The	  relevant	  sort	  of	  doxastic	  control	  would	  require	  that	  an	  agent	  be	  able	  to	  consciously	  exercise	  direct	  voluntary	  control	  over	   coming	   to	   believe	   on	   the	   basis	   of	   an	   intention	   formed	  by	  making	   a	   practical	  decision	  to	  believe,	  where	  the	  decision	  and	  subsequent	  event	  of	  coming	  to	  believe	  are	  motivated	  by	  practical	  reasons	  alone.	  	  
4.1.	  Deciding	  and	  Judging	  In	  what	   follows,	   I	   should	  be	  understood	  as	   referring	   to	  practical	  decisions	  when	   I	  use	   ‘deciding’	   and	   its	   cognates.	   I	  will	   take	   a	   practical	   decision	   to	   be	   a	  momentary	  mental	   action	   of	   actively	   forming	   an	   intention	   in	   response	   to	   practical	   reasons	   in	  order	   to	   resolve	   some	   practical	   uncertainty	   that	   arises	   when	   deliberating	   about	  what	  to	  do	  in	  some	  situation.17	  So	  in	  asking	  whether	  it	   is	  conceptually	  possible	  for	  an	  agent	  to	  consciously	  decide	  to	  believe,	  the	  challenge	  is	  to	  determine	  whether	  the	  following	   process	   is	   conceptually	   possible.	   First,	   an	   agent	   consciously	   deliberates	  about	  practical	  considerations	  that	  favor	  believing	  that	  p	  versus	  not	  believing	  that	  p.	  Next,	  the	  agent,	  being	  unable	  to	  settle	  on	  what	  to	  do,	  consciously	  decides	  to	  believe	  that	  p,	  thereby	  consciously	  forming	  an	  intention	  to	  believe	  that	  p.	  Finally,	  the	  agent	  
                                                            16	  It	   is	  worth	  noting	  that	  my	  argument	  is	  similar	  to	  an	  arguments	  offered	  by	  Adler	  2002,	  chapter	  2.	  Church	  2002,	  Clarke	  1986,	  O’Shaugnessy	  1980,	  Scott-­‐Kakures	  1994,	  and	  others.	   I	  will	  not	  rehearse	  the	   differences	   between	   their	   arguments	   and	   the	   one	   offered	   here..	   I	   acknowledge	   the	   similarities	  between	  the	  arguments	  while	  also	  noting	  that	  critics	  of	  our	  strategies	  cannot	  simply	  offer	  a	  one-­‐size-­‐fits	   all	   response	   to	   any	   of	   the	   arguments	   against	   the	   conceptual	   possibility	   of	   direct	   doxastic	  voluntarism.	   	  The	  differences,	  as	  one	  should	  expect,	  between	  authors	  are	  subtle	  in	  places	  and	  more	  obvious	  in	  others.	  	  	  17	  See	  Mele	  2003,197-­‐214,	  for	  a	  defense	  of	  such	  an	  account	  of	  deciding.	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is	  aware	  of	  being	  caused	  to	  come	  to	  believe	  that	  p	  straightaway	  by	  the	  intention	  and	  the	   agent	   is	   aware	   of	   doing	   so	   in	   response	   to	   the	   practical	   reasons	   that	   favor	  acquiring	   a	   belief	   that	   p.	   It	   is	   this	   process	   that	   I	   am	   claiming	   is	   conceptually	  impossible.	  I	  will	  assume	  that	   there	   is	  an	  analogous	  phenomenon	  to	  making	  a	  practical	  decision	  when	  we	  enter	  the	  theoretical	  sphere	  where	  doxastic	  deliberation	  occurs.	  Marking	  out	  their	  differences	  and	  similarities	  will	  be	  useful	  for	  what	  is	  to	  follow.	  	  First,	   regarding	   decision-­‐making,	   making	   a	   decision	   is	   required	   in	   cases	  where	   an	   agent	   lacks	   the	   time	  and	   cognitive	   resources	  necessary	   to	   resolve	   some	  practical	   uncertainty	   by	   more	   extended	   methods	   such	   as	   further	   evaluation	   of	  practical	  reasons,	  etc.	   	  An	  example	  of	  this	  may	  be	  an	  agent	  having	  to	  get	  settled	  on	  what	  she	  will	  order	  when	  out	  for	  dinner	  with	  a	  group	  of	  people	  when	  she	  is	  asked	  what	   she	   will	   have	   from	   the	  menu.	   	   Notice	   that	   when	   one	  makes	   a	   decision	   and	  forms	   an	   intention	   by	   doing	   so	   the	   acquisition	   of	   an	   intention	   is	   the	   intentional	  outcome	  of	  the	  decision.	  	  But	  it	  is	  not	  the	  case	  that	  the	  intention	  to	  A	  is	  the	  intended	  outcome—i.e.,	   the	   specific	   intention	   acquired	   with	   its	   content	   was	   not	   intended.	  	  Rather,	  the	  outcome	  of	  acquiring	  an	  intention	  (whether	  to	  A	  or	  refrain	  from	  A-­‐ing)	  is	  intentional.	   	   Of	   course,	   the	   agent	   intends	   to	   make	   up	   her	   mind	   (acquire	   an	  intention).	   	   And	   she	   partially	   executes	   this	   intention	   by	   deciding	   (along	   with	  deliberating).	   	   But	   the	   agent,	   in	   deciding	   to	   A,	   does	   not	   decide	   to	   acquire	   the	  intention	  to	  A;	  and	  the	  reasons	  for	  deciding	  are	  simply	  reasons	  for	  A-­‐ing.	   	  But	  that	  the	  intention	  itself	  is	  not	  the	  intentional	  object	  of	  the	  mental	  action	  of	  deciding	  does	  not	  make	  it	  any	  less	  the	  intentional	  outcome	  of	  the	  decision.	  	  It	  is	  no	  less	  intentional	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than	  each	  step	  one	  takes	  when	  walking	  to	  the	  store	  in	  order	  to	  get	  some	  bread.	  	  One	  does	  not	  intend	  to	  take	  each	  step,	  but	  each	  step	  is	  an	  intentional	  movement.18	  When	  trying	  to	  settle	  on	  what	  to	  believe,	  judging	  (or,	  if	  you	  prefer,	  a	  doxastic-­‐decision)	  may	  play	  a	  similar	  functional	  role	  in	  the	  economy	  of	  making	  up	  our	  minds	  about	  what	   to	  believe	   that	  practical	  decisions	  play	   in	  making	  up	  our	  minds	  about	  how	  to	  act.	  There	  may	  be	  some	   important	  differences	  between	   judging	   that	  p	  and	  deciding	   to	   A.	   But	   they	   are	   more	   alike	   than	   dissimilar.	   	   For	   instance,	   judging	   is	  something	  an	  agent	  does	  by	  which	  she	  terminates	  doxastic	  deliberation	  and	  comes	  to	  acquire	  a	  belief	  in	  cases	  where	  the	  agent	  must	  make	  up	  her	  mind	  and	  get	  settled	  on	  what	  to	  believe.	  Judging	  is	  something	  done	  in	  response	  to	  theoretical	  reasons	  just	  as	  practical	  decisions	  are	  performed	  in	  response	  to	  practical	  reasons.	  	  In	  judging,	  an	  agent	  (at	  least	  partially)	  executes	  her	  intention	  to	  make	  up	  her	  mind	  about	  whether	  it	  is	  the	  case	  that	  p.	  	  Additionally,	  an	  agent	  may	  acquire	  a	  belief	  by	  judging	  just	  as	  she	  may	  acquire	  an	  intention	  by	  deciding.	  	  Finally,	  if	  we	  suppose	  that	  an	  agent	  can	  judge	  in	  cases	  of	   feeling	  theoretically	  uncertain	   just	  as	  one	  can	  decide	   in	  cases	  of	   feeling	  practically	  uncertain,	  we	  can	  regard	  the	  strength	  of	   the	  attitude	  acquired	   in	  either	  case	  to	  be	  determined	  by	  the	  strength	  of	  the	  reasons	  that	  cause	  the	  formation	  of	  the	  attitude.	  So	  an	  agent	  may	  acquire	  a	  partial	  belief	  in	  response	  to	  judging	  and	  a	  partial	  intention	  in	  response	  to	  a	  decision.	  	  In	  either	  case,	  the	  strength	  of	  the	  attitude	  (in	  a	  rational	  agent)	  is	  fixed	  by	  the	  reasons	  that	  count	  in	  favor	  of	  the	  attitude	  taken	  (see	  Holton	   2008).	   	   So	   it	   is	   not	   necessary	   that	   a	   token	   of	   either	   type	   of	  mental	   action	  
                                                            18	   I	   am	   here	   assuming	   that	   the	   Simple	   View	   of	   intentional	   action	   is	   incorrect	   and	   that	   the	   Single	  Phenomenon	  View	  is	  correct.	  For	  defenses	  of	  versions	  of	  the	  Single	  Phenomenon	  View,	  see	  Bratman	  1997,	  Brand	  1997,	  and	  Mele	  1992.	   	  For	  defenses	  of	  the	  Simple	  View,	  see	  Adams	  1986,	  Garcia	  1990,	  and	  McCann	  1998.	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result	   in	   full	  belief	  or	   full	   intention.	   In	  both	  cases,	   the	  attitude	   formed	  can	  only	  be	  formed	  in	  response	  to	  reasons	  and	  its	  strength	  reflects	  the	  strength	  of	  the	  reasons	  for	  which	  it	  is	  acquired.	  	  In	  fact,	  it	  is	  more	  conceptually	  and	  psychologically	  realistic	  to	  regard	  either	  type	  of	  mental	  action	  as	  resulting	  in	  an	  attitude	  that	  is	  weaker	  than	  an	   attitude	   that	   is	   acquired	   on	   the	   basis	   of	   deliberation	   that	   terminated	   naturally	  with	   the	   agent	   feeling	  psychologically	   certain	   about	  what	   she	  will	   do	  or	  what	   she	  believes.	  	  	  Finally,	   there	   is	   one	   important	   difference	   between	   deciding	   and	   judging.	  When	  we	  judge,	  it	  is	  in	  order	  to	  make	  up	  our	  minds	  about	  what	  to	  believe	  or	  what	  to	  take	  as	  true.	  When	  we	  decide,	  we	  do	  so	  in	  order	  to	  make	  up	  our	  minds	  about	  what	  to	  do.	  We	   do	   not	   decide	   in	   order	   to	  make	   up	   our	  minds	   about	  what	   to	   intend.	   This	  difference	  may	  prove	  to	  be	  important	  in	  what	  follows.19	  
4.2.	  The	  Case	  Against	  DDV	  If	  an	  agent	  engages	  in	  doxastic	  deliberation,	  then	  an	  agent	  is	  deliberating	  about	  what	  sort	   of	   doxastic	   attitude	   to	   take	   towards	   a	   proposition.	   	   Assuming	   that	   the	   claims	  made	  above	  about	  belief,	  truth,	  and	  reasons	  are	  correct,	  then	  the	  reasons	  an	  agent	  consciously	   considers	   in	   doxastic	   deliberation	   are	   what	   the	   agent	   takes	   to	   be	  epistemic	  reasons,	  that	  is,	  the	  agent	  considers	  (putative)	  evidence	  for	  the	  truth	  of	  a	  proposition.	  	  So	  the	  belief	  formed	  by	  doxastic	  deliberation	  will	  be	  based	  on	  what	  an	  agent	   takes	   to	  be	  epistemic	  reasons.	   	  However,	   if	  an	  agent	   is	  engaging	   in	  practical	  deliberation	  about	  how	  to	  decide	  with	  respect	  to	  what	  to	  believe,	  then	  the	  agent	  is	  considering	   practical	   reasons	   in	   his	   deliberation.	   	   Practical	   reasons	   are	   non-­‐
                                                            19	  In	  Buckareff	  2011	  I	  discuss	  forming	  beliefs	  and	  forming	  intentions	  in	  more	  depth.	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evidential	  considerations.	  They	  are	  not	  reasons	  that	  count	  in	  favor	  of	  the	  truth	  of	  p.	  So,	  in	  the	  practical	  case,	  an	  agent	  is	  not	  deliberating	  about	  what	  to	  believe.	  	  At	  best,	  he	   is	   deliberating	   about	   what	   it	   would	   be	   best	   to	   come	   to	   believe	   for	   practical	  reasons.	  	  That	  is,	  he	  is	  considering	  reasons	  for	  the	  desirability	  of	  believing	  that	  p	  and	  for	  deciding	  to	  believe	  that	  p,	  but	  he	  is	  not	  deliberating	  about	  reasons	  for	  believing	  that	  p.	  	  	  The	   differences	   between	   cases	   of	   doxastic	   and	   practical	   deliberation	   are	  highlighted	   by	   contrasting	   two	   cases	   of	   deliberation—one	   doxastic	   and	   one	  practical.	   I	   propose	   comparing	   a	   case	   of	   doxastic	   deliberation	   versus	   practical	  deliberation	   where	   the	   purpose	   is	   the	   same.	   Namely,	   in	   both	   cases,	   the	   agent	   is	  trying	   to	   make	   up	   his	   mind	   about	   whether	   to	   believe	   p	   or	   believe	   not-­‐p.	   By	  contrasting	  these	  cases,	  I	  hope	  to	  show	  that	  in	  the	  practical	  case,	  coming	  to	  believe	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  settling	  some	  practical	  deliberation	  by	  making	  a	  practical	  decision	  is	  conceptually	  impossible.	  	  	  
4.1.1.	  Doxastic	  deliberation	  over	  whether	  to	  believe	  that	  p	  Consider	  two	  scenarios.	  In	  the	  first,	  an	  agent	  is	  deliberating	  over	  whether	  to	  believe	  that	  p	  or	  ~p.	  The	  agent	  considers	  the	  evidence	  he	  has	  that	  counts	  in	  favor	  of	  p	  and	  the	  evidence	  that	  favors	  ~p.	   If	   the	  agent	  concludes	  that	  the	  evidence	  favors	  p	  over	  ~p,	   then	   the	   agent	   will	   simply	   end	   his	   deliberation	   by	   acquiring	   the	   appropriate	  belief.	  	  	   In	   the	   second	   scenario,	   the	  agent	  deliberates	   and	   reaches	  an	   impasse,	  with	  the	  preponderance	  of	  his	  evidence	  not	  clearly	  favoring	  p	  over	  ~p.	  I	  take	  it	  there	  are	  a	   few	   things	   that	   the	   agent	   can	   do.	   First,	   the	   agent	  may	   simply	   suspend	   belief	   by	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terminating	   deliberation	   and	   not	   acquiring	   any	   belief.	   Second,	   the	   agent	   may	   be	  unable	   to	   acquire	   a	   belief	   and,	   perhaps	   owing	   to	   practical	   pressures,	   non-­‐doxastically	   accept	   that	   p,	   where	   non-­‐doxastically	   accepting	   that	   p	   is	   a	   way	   of	  regarding	  p	  as	  true	  without	  believing	  p.20	  Finally,	  the	  agent	  may	  judge	  that	  p	  (in	  the	  relevant	  sense	  of	  ‘judge’	  articulated	  in	  the	  previous	  sub-­‐section	  of	  this	  essay).	  In	  that	  case,	   the	   agent	  may	   take	   the	   evidence	   to	   favor	  p	   slightly	   over	  ~p,	   but	   in	   order	   to	  acquire	  a	  belief	  the	  agent	  must	  make	  the	  mental	  effort	  involved	  in	  the	  mental	  action	  of	  judging	  that	  p.	  In	  the	  judging	  case,	  the	  agent	  will	  acquire	  a	  belief	  the	  strength	  of	  which	  is	  proportionate	  to	  the	  reasons	  the	  agent	  takes	  himself	  to	  have	  for	  believing	  that	  p.	   In	  what	   follows,	   I	  will	   ignore	   the	  second	  option.	   I	  will	  discuss	   the	   first	  and	  third	   options.	   But	   I	   will	   focus	   on	   the	   third	   option	   since,	   as	   I	   contended	   in	   the	  previous	   sub-­‐section,	   I	   take	   the	   third	   option	   to	   be	   the	   theoretical	   analogue	   to	  practical	  deciding.	  	   Now	   in	   both	   the	   first	   and	   third	   scenarios,	   the	   agent	   is	   deliberating	   about	  what	  to	  believe.	  In	  the	  first	  scenario,	  I	  assume	  that	  the	  belief	  acquired	  is	  full-­‐belief,	  with	  the	  agent	  taking	  his	  evidence	  to	  clearly	  support	  p	  over	  ~p.	  In	  the	  third	  scenario,	  the	  agent’s	  evidence	  does	  not	  decisively	  favor	  p	  over	  ~p.	  Hence,	  if	  the	  agent	  judges	  that	   p	   and	   acquires	   a	   belief	   as	   a	   result,	   the	   belief	   acquired	   will	   be	   significantly	  weaker	  than	  in	  the	  first	  scenario.	  	  
                                                            20	   My	   own	   views	   on	   belief	   and	   non-­‐doxastic	   acceptance	   most	   closely	   approximate	   the	   views	   of	  Bratman	  1992;	  Shah	  and	  Velleman	  2005;	  Stalnaker	  1987;	  and	  Velleman	  2000c.	  Other	  accounts	  of	  the	  distinction	   have	   been	   offered	   by	   Alston	   1996;	   Bishop	   2002	   and	   2007;	   Cohen	   1992;	   Engel	   1998;	  Frankish	   2004;	   and	   Tuomela	   2000.	   	   There	   are	   significant	   differences	   between	   these	   authors.	  	  However,	  they	  all	  defend	  a	  distinction	  between	  belief	  and	  non-­‐doxastic	  acceptance.	  	  The	  differences	  they	  claim	  for	  each	  are	  close	  enough	  for	  their	  respective	  theories	  to	  bear	  a	  family	  resemblance	  to	  one	  another.	   	  My	   own	   views	   have	   changed	   over	   time,	   but	   I	   am	   still	   in	   basic	   agreement	  with	   the	  main	  features	  of	  the	  general	  account	  of	  non-­‐doxastic	  acceptance	  I	  outline	  in	  Buckareff	  2004	  and	  2005.	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   Importantly,	  if	  the	  agent	  in	  either	  scenario	  was	  self-­‐aware,	  being	  conscious	  of	  what	   he	   was	   doing	   in	   deliberating	   about	   his	   epistemic	   reasons,	   then	   the	   entire	  process	  would	  be	  one	  in	  which	  the	  agent	  is	  sensitive	  to	  what	  considerations	  favor	  p	  over	  ~p.	  The	  agent	  would	  be	  able	   to	   indicate	  what	   reasons	   favor	  p	   over	  ~p	  when	  deliberating	  and	  would	  be	  aware	  of	  why	  he	  settles	  on	  p	  over	  ~p.	  Finally,	  the	  belief	  would	   be	   one	   that	   the	   agent	   would	   be	   able	   to	   immediately	   recognize	   as	   having	  resulted	   from	   a	   process	   of	   considering	   what	   epistemic	   reasons	   the	   agent	   took	  himself	   to	   have	   for	   believing	   either	   statement.	   Hence,	   the	   agent	   would	   not	   be	  running	  afoul	  of	  the	  constraints	  on	  belief	  that	  I	  discussed	  in	  section	  3.	  
4.1.2.	  Practical	  deliberation	  over	  whether	  to	  believe	  that	  p	  	  Now	  suppose	  that	  an	  agent	  is	  deliberating	  about	  whether	  or	  not	  to	  believe	  that	  p	  or	  believe	   that	   ~p.	   In	   this	   case,	   the	   agent	   is	   only	   considering	   practical	   reasons.	   The	  agent	   does	   not	   consider	   any	   epistemic	   reasons.	   This	   scenario	   would	   be	   like	  deliberating	   about	  whether	   or	   not	   to	   have	   another	   glass	   of	  wine	  with	   one’s	  meal.	  The	   focus	  would	  be	   solely	   on	  practical	   considerations	   that	   favors	   believing	   that	  p	  versus	  believing	  that	  ~p.	  So	  what	  is	  being	  deliberated	  about	  are	  not	  considerations	  that	  favor	  the	  truth	  of	  p	  versus	  ~p.	  	  	   	   Consider	   two	   scenarios.	   Suppose	   in	   the	   first	   scenario	   that	   the	   agent	  concludes	   that	   she	   will	   believe	   that	   p	   on	   the	   basis	   of	   her	   deliberation,	   simply	  acquiring	   the	   intention	  to	  believe	   that	  p	  without	  having	  to	  make	  a	  decision.	   In	   the	  second	  scenario,	  the	  agent	  is	  faced	  with	  some	  practical	  uncertainty.	  Hence,	  she	  must	  make	   up	   her	  mind	   about	  whether	   she	  will	   believe	   that	   p	   or	   believe	   that	   ~p.	   She	  decides	   to	   believe	   that	   p,	   thereby	   forming	   the	   intention	   to	   believe	   that	   p.	   If	   we	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suppose	  that	  the	  agent	  can	  get	  as	  far	  as	  acquiring	  an	  intention,	  whether	  or	  not	  she	  must	   decide	   to	   settle	   some	   practical	   uncertainty,	   can	   she	   successfully	   come	   to	  believe?	  That	  is,	  can	  she	  successfully	  execute	  her	  intention	  to	  believe	  that	  p?	  	   	   Remember,	   the	  agent	   is	  aware	  of	  what	  she	   is	  doing	   throughout	   the	  process	  being	  described	  above.	  Hence,	  I	  take	  it	  that	  the	  agent	  is	  aware	  of	  the	  sort	  of	  reasons	  for	  which	  she	  would	  be	  coming	  to	  believe.	  Assuming	  that	  the	  process	  is	  one	  of	  which	  the	   agent	   is	   continuously	   aware,	   even	   if	   the	   agent	   could	   successfully	   form	   the	  intention	   to	   believe,	   the	   agent	   would	   be	   unable	   to	   execute	   her	   intention	  without	  performing	   some	   other	   actions	   to	   produce	   the	   belief.	   Assuming	   any	   success	   in	  coming	   to	   believe	   as	   a	   result,	   the	   agent	   would	   not	   be	   exercising	   basic	   voluntary	  control.	  It	  would	  be	  indirect	  control.	  	  	  	  	   	   Any	  success	  in	  immediately	  coming	  to	  believe	  in	  this	  case	  would	  require	  that	  the	  agent	  would	  have	  to	  successfully	  execute	  a	  present-­‐directed	  intention	  to	  believe	  that	  p	  now	  while	  being	  unaware	  of	  any	  epistemic	  reasons	  supporting	  p.	  She	  would	  have	  to	  be	  able	  to	  come	  to	  explicitly	  represent	  p	  as	  true	  in	  the	  way	  fitting	  for	  a	  belief	  being	  fully	  aware	  that	  she	  is	  doing	  so	  only	  for	  reasons	  that	  do	  not	  bear	  at	  all	  on	  truth	  of	  p.	   I	   suggest	   that	   this	   is	   conceptually	   impossible	   given	   the	   constraints	   on	   belief	  acquisition	  and	  maintenance	  articulated	  in	  the	  previous	  section.	  	  	   It	   is	   worth	   stopping	   for	   a	   moment	   and	   comparing	   this	   case	   of	   practical	  deliberation	  aimed	  at	  settling	  on	  what	  to	  believe	  with	  the	  case	  of	  coming	  to	  believe	  on	   the	  basis	   of	   doxastic	   deliberation.	   In	   the	   case	   of	   practical	   deliberation,	  what	   is	  assumed	  is	  that	  no	  epistemic	  reasons	  are	  considered.	  In	  this	  case,	  the	  entire	  process	  involves	   considering	   reasons	   that	   count	   in	   favor	   of	   believing	   that	   p	   being	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worthwhile.	  In	  the	  case	  of	  doxastic	  deliberation,	  the	  entire	  process	  involves	  thinking	  about	  epistemic	  reasons	  that	  count	  in	  favor	  or	  against	  the	  truth	  of	  p.	  In	  other	  words,	  in	  the	  case	  of	  doxastic	  deliberation,	  the	  process	  is	  directed	  at	  determining	  whether	  p	  or	   ~p	   is	   true	   and	   what	   reasons	   favor	   either	   option.	   In	   the	   case	   of	   practical	  deliberation,	  there	  is	  no	  concern	  for	  the	  reasons	  that	  favor	  the	  truth	  of	  p	  or	  ~p.	  To	  the	   extent	   that	   there	   is	   any	   consideration	   of	   epistemic	   reasons,	   the	   agent	   is	   only	  considering	  what	  counts	   in	   favor	  of	   it	  being	   true	   that	  believing	   that	  p	  or	  believing	  that	   ~p	   is	   the	   more	   worthwhile	   option.	   The	   agent	   is	   in	   no	   position	   to	   answer	  whether	  p	  is	  true	  if	  asked	  once	  she	  forms	  the	  intention	  to	  believe	  that	  p.	  And	  if	  the	  transparency	  thesis	   is	  correct,	   the	  agent	  would	  not	  be	  able	  to	  answer	  whether	  she	  thinks	   p	   is	   true.	   That	   was	   not	   what	   she	   was	   thinking	   about	   when	   engaging	   in	  practical	   deliberation.	   She	   can	   answer	   that	   she	   thinks	   that	   believing	   that	   p	   is	  worthwhile.	  But	  since	  she	  cannot	  honestly	  answer	  whether	  she	  thinks	  p	  is	  true,	  she	  is	  in	  no	  position	  to	  answer	  that	  she	  believes	  that	  p.	  She	  does	  not.	  Absent	  some	  sort	  of	   sudden	  awareness	  of	   apparent	   epistemic	   reasons	   for	  believing	   that	  p,	   any	   such	  attempt	  at	  immediately	  believing	  that	  p	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  her	  intention	  to	  believe	  that	  
p	   would	   be	   unsuccessful.	   And,	   ex	   hypothesi,	   such	   a	   sudden	   awareness	   of	   putative	  epistemic	   reasons	   is	   ruled	   out	   since	   the	   attempt	   at	   coming	   to	   believe	   that	   p	   is	  supposed	  to	  be	  made	  solely	  for	  practical	  reasons.	  	  	   If	   the	  foregoing	  is	  correct,	   then	  coming	  to	  believe	  is	  not	  a	  basic	  action-­‐type.	  DDV	   is	   untenable.	   	   It	   is	   conceptually	   impossible	   to	   exercise	   conscious	   direct	  voluntary	   control	   over	   coming	   to	   believe	   just	   like	   one	   would	   exercise	   over	   an	  uncontroversial	   basic	   action.	   	   The	   agent	   cannot	   get	   past	   acquiring	   an	   intention	   to	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believe	   that	  p	   because	   of	   the	   constraints	   on	   belief	   articulated	   in	   section	   3	   of	   this	  paper.	  	  Any	  success	  an	  agent	  may	  enjoy	  in	  executing	  the	  intention	  to	  come	  to	  believe	  immediately	   would	   require	   changing	   things	   so	   much	   as	   to	   have	   something	   that	  could	   no	   longer	   be	   accurately	   described	   as	   a	   basic	   action	   performed	   solely	   for	  practical	  reasons.	  For	  instance,	  someone	  may	  argue	  that	  an	  agent	  could	  execute	  an	  intention	  to	  come	  to	  believe	  that	  p	  now	  if	  there	  is	  an	  intervener	  who,	  being	  aware	  of	  the	   agent’s	   intention,	   somehow	  manipulates	   the	   agent	   so	   she	   comes	   to	  believe.	   In	  any	   such	   case,	   the	   agent’s	   coming	   to	   believe	  would	   not	   be	   an	   action,	  much	   less	   a	  basic	  action.	  This	  is	  so	  because	  any	  such	  intervention	  will	  result	  in	  coming	  to	  believe	  being	   the	   consequence	   of	   a	   deviant	   causal	   process	   that	   makes	   what	   happens	   in	  coming	  to	  believe	  not	  count	  as	  a	  basic	  action.	  Events	  and	  processes	  that	  result	  from	  causal	  deviance,	  including	  causal	  chains	  involving	  an	  intervener,	  are	  taken	  to	  fail	  to	  count	  as	  actions	  in	  the	  action	  theoretic	  literature.21	  And	  what	  holds	  in	  the	  case	  of	  an	  intervener	   is	   true	   of	   any	   process	   that	   bypasses	   the	   normal	   causal	   route	   from	   an	  intention	  to	  some	  behavior.	  Causal	  deviance	  of	  any	  sort	  threatens	  the	  actional	  status	  of	  a	  mental	  event	  or	  process.	  So	  coming	  to	  believe	  that	  results	  from	  a	  deviant	  causal	  process	  cannot	  be	  a	  basic	  action.	  	  It	  may	   also	   be	   suggested	   that	   the	   agent	   could	   execute	   her	   intention	   if	   she	  suddenly	  became	  aware	  of	  epistemic	  reasons	  after	  forming	  her	  intention	  to	  believe	  now.	   With	   respect	   to	   the	   latter,	   if	   the	   agent	   comes	   to	   believe	   for	   a	   mixture	   of	  
                                                            21	  Exploring	  why	  causal	  deviance	  is	  a	  problem	  for	  actions	  is	  beyond	  the	  scope	  of	  this	  essay.	  I	  suggest	  that	  interested	  readers	  consult	  the	  introduction	  and	  essays	  in	  Aguilar	  and	  Buckareff	  2010	  as	  well	  as	  Bishop	  1989	  for	  more	  on	  causal	  deviance.	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practical	   and	   epistemic	   reasons,	   where	   the	   epistemic	   reasons	   are	   acquired	   after	  forming	  the	  intention	  to	  believe	  that	  p,	  then	  we	  have	  a	  case	  where	  coming	  to	  believe	  is	   no	   longer	   based	   entirely	   on	   practical	   reasons.	   Hence,	   we	   would	   no	   longer	   be	  dealing	  with	  a	  case	  of	  exercising	  DDV-­‐type	  control.	  	   The	  argument	  that	  emerges	  from	  the	  foregoing	  is	  the	  following.	  I	  trust	  that	  I	  have	  provided	  ample	  reasons	  for	  accepting	  each	  of	  the	  premises.	  
	  
1. Necessarily,	   if	   I	   can	   successfully	   consciously	   execute	   an	   intention	   to	  immediately	   come	   to	   believe	   that	   p,	   then	   my	   coming	   to	   believe	   that	   p	  could	  be	  caused	  in	  full	  consciousness	  solely	  by	  an	  intention	  to	  believe	  that	  
p	   formed	  by	  deciding	   to	  believe	   that	  p	   on	   the	  basis	  of	  practical	   reasons	  alone.	  
2. Necessarily,	  if	  my	  coming	  to	  believe	  that	  p	  could	  have	  been	  solely	  caused	  in	  full	  consciousness	  by	  an	  intention	  to	  believe	  that	  p	  formed	  by	  deciding	  to	   believe	   that	   p	   on	   the	   basis	   of	   practical	   reasons	   alone,	   then	   I	   can	  consciously	  come	  to	  believe	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  practical	  reasons	  alone.	  	  
3. But,	  I	  cannot	  consciously	  come	  to	  believe	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  practical	  reasons	  alone.	  
4. Therefore,	   I	   cannot	   successfully	   consciously	   execute	   an	   intention	   to	  immediately	  come	  to	  believe	  that	  p.	  That	  this	  argument	  resembles	  Williams’	  and	  others	  that	  have	  been	  offered	  should	  be	  apparent	   to	   those	   familiar	   with	   the	   literature.	   But	   my	   strategy	   differs	   in	   some	  important	  ways.	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   First,	   I	   am	   not	   simply	   emphasizing	   coming	   to	   believe	   without	   having	   any	  concern	  for	  the	  truth	  of	  p	  or	  without	  any	  concern	  for	  any	  considerations	  that	  count	  in	  favor	  of	  the	  truth	  of	  p.	   	  Second,	  I	  am	  not	  allowing	  for	  the	  possibility	  of	  an	  agent	  coming	  to	  believe	  and	  then	  losing	  the	  belief.	  	  	   	   Regarding	   the	   first	  point,	   I	   am	  arguing	   that	   it	   is	   conceptually	   impossible	   to	  execute	   an	   intention	   to	   believe	   that	   p	   where	   the	   only	   reasons	   considered	   are	  practical	   reasons	   and	   no	   epistemic	   reasons	   that	   bear	   on	   the	   truth	   of	   p	   are	  considered	  at	  any	  point	  in	  the	  process.	  Absent	  some	  sudden	  awareness	  of	  apparent	  or	  actual	  epistemic	  reasons	  for	  believing	  that	  p	  or	  some	  sort	  of	  intervention,	  such	  an	  intention	   cannot	   be	   executed.	   In	   the	   event	   of	   any	   such	   awareness	   of	   epistemic	  reasons	  or	   the	   intervention	  of	   some	   third	  party,	   the	   case	  will	  no	   longer	  be	  one	  of	  successfully	  executing	  an	  intention	  to	  believe	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  practical	  reasons	  alone	  or	   it	  will	   fail	   to	  be	  a	  case	  of	  a	  genuine	  basic	  action	  due	  to	  the	  deviant	  causal	  chain	  that	  would	  obtain	  between	   the	   intention	  and	  coming	   to	  believe.	  As	   for	   the	  second	  point,	  my	   claim	   that	   is	   that	   successfully	   executing	  an	   intention	   to	   come	   to	  believe	  solely	  for	  practical	  reasons	  is	  conceptually	  impossible.	  It	  is	  not	  a	  matter	  of	  acquiring	  and	  then	  losing	  the	  belief.	  My	  claim	  is	  that	  an	  agent	  could	  not	  get	  past	  acquiring	  an	  intention,	  much	  less	  successfully	  execute	  it	  only	  to	  lose	  the	  belief.	  If	  I	  am	  right,	  then	  my	  argument	  is	  immune	  to	  the	  objections	  raised	  by	  Winters	  to	  Williams’	  argument.	  	  
	  
5.	  Conclusion	  I	   believe	   I	   have	   shown	   that	   it	   is	   conceptually	   impossible	   to	   successfully	   exercise	  direct	   voluntary	   control	   over	   coming	   to	   believe	   on	   the	   basis	   of	   practical	   reasons	  alone.	   I	   have	   not	   shown,	   however,	   that	   an	   agent	   cannot	   exercise	   direct	   voluntary	  
  27 
control	   over	   coming	   to	   believe	   on	   the	   basis	   of	   some	   mixture	   of	   epistemic	   and	  practical	  reasons.	  Of	  course,	  whether	  or	  not	  my	  own	  attempt	  at	  showing	  that	  DDV	  is	  conceptually	  impossible	  will	  finally	  be	  regarded	  by	  anyone	  as	  successful	  remains	  to	  be	  seen.	  But	  if	  I	  have	  succeeded	  in	  achieving	  the	  goal	  of	  this	  essay,	  then	  we	  can	  be	  assured	  that	  there	  is	  at	  least	  one	  type	  of	  doxastic	  agency	  we	  cannot	  exercise.	  Again	  this	  does	  not	  mean	   that	   the	  door	   is	   closed	  on	   the	   conceptual	  possibility	  of	   agents	  exercising	  any	  other	  species	  of	  direct	  doxastic	  control.	  But	  I	  have	  my	  doubts.22	  	  	  Works	  Cited:	  Adams,	   F.	   (1986)	   Intention	   and	   intentional	   action:	   the	   simple	   view.	   Mind	   and	  
Language,	  1,	  281-­‐301.	  Adler,	  J.	  (2002)	  Belief’s	  own	  ethics.	  Cambridge:	  MIT	  Press.	  Aguilar,	   J.	   and	  Buckareff,	  A.	   (eds.)	   (2010)	  Causing	  human	  actions:	  new	  perspectives	  
on	  the	  causal	  theory	  of	  action.	  Cambridge,	  MA:	  MIT	  Press.	  Alston,	   W.	   (1989)	   The	   deontological	   conception	   of	   epistemic	   justification.	   	   In	  
Epistemic	   Justification:	   Essays	   in	   the	   Theory	   of	   Knowledge	   (pp.	   115-­‐52).	  	  Ithaca:	  Cornell	  University	  Press.	  Anscombe,	   G.E.M.	   (1963/2000)	   Intention,	   2nd	   ed.	   Cambridge,	   MA:	   Harvard	  University	  Press.	  Audi,	   R.	   (2001a)	   Doxastic	   voluntarism	   and	   the	   ethics	   of	   belief.	   	   In	  M.	   Steup	   (ed.)	  
Knowledge,	  Truth,	  and	  Duty	  (pp.	  93-­‐111).	  	  New	  York:	  Oxford	  University	  Press.	  Bennett,	  J.	  (1990)	  Why	  is	  belief	  involuntary?	  Analysis,	  50,	  87-­‐107.	  
                                                            26	   I	  wish	  to	   thank	  Earl	  Conee,	  Andrew	  Cullison,	  Ward	  Jones,	  Daniel	  Mittag,	  Rico	  Vitz,	  and	  especially	  Richard	  Feldman	  for	  helpful	  comments	  on	  this	  paper.	  	   
  28 
Bishop,	  J.	  (1989)	  Natural	  Agency:	  An	  Essay	  on	  the	  Causal	  Theory	  of	  Action.	  New	  York:	  Cambridge	  University	  Press.	  Bishop,	   J.	   (2007)	   Believing	   by	   faith:	   an	   essay	   in	   the	   epistemology	   and	   ethics	   of	  
religious	  belief.	  	  New	  York:	  Oxford	  University	  Press.	  Brand,	  M.	   (1997)	   Intention	   and	   intentional	   action.	   In	  G.	  Holstrom-­‐Hintikka	   and	  R.	  Tuomela	   (eds.)	   Contemporary	   action	   theory,	   vol	   1:	   individual	   action	   (197-­‐217).	  	  Dordrecht:	  Kluwer.	  Bratman,	   M.	   (1997)	   Two	   faces	   of	   intention.	   Reprinted	   in	   A.	   Mele,	   (ed.)	   The	  
philosophy	  of	  action	  (178-­‐203).	  New	  York:	  Oxford	  University	  Press.	  Brown,	   J.	   (2008)	   Subject-­‐sensitive	   invariantism	   and	   the	   knowledge	   norm	   for	  practical	  reasoning.	  	  Noûs,	  42,	  167-­‐89.	  Buckareff,	   A.	   (2004)	   Acceptance	   and	   deciding	   to	   believe.	   Journal	   of	   Philosophical	  
Research,	  29,	  173-­‐91.	  Buckareff,	   A.	   (2005)	   How	   (not)	   to	   think	   about	   mental	   action.	   Philosphical	  
Explorations,	  8,	  83-­‐89.	  Buckareff,	  A.	  (2006)	  Compatibilism	  and	  doxastic	  control.	  Philosophia,	  34,	  143-­‐52.	  Buckareff,	  A.	  (2007)	  Mental	  overpopulation	  and	  mental	  action:	  protecting	  intentions	  from	  mental	  birth	  control.	  Canadian	  Journal	  of	  Philosophy,	  37,	  49-­‐66.	  Buckareff,	  A.	  (2011)	  Action-­‐individuation	  and	  doxastic	  agency.	  Theoria,	  77,	  312-­‐32.	  Church,	  J.	  (2002)	  Taking	  it	  to	  heart:	  What	  choice	  do	  we	  have?	  	  The	  Monist,	  85,	  361-­‐80.	  Danto,	  A.	  (1965)	  Basic	  actions.	  	  American	  Philosophical	  Quarterly,	  2,	  141-­‐148.	  Edgely,	  R.	  (1969)	  Reason	  in	  theory	  and	  practice.	  London:	  Hutchinson.	  
  29 
Fantl,	   J.	   and	   McGrath,	   M.	   (2002)	   Evidence,	   pragmatics,	   and	   justification.	   	   The	  
Philosophical	  Review,	  111,	  67-­‐94.	  Feldman,	   R.	   (2001)	   Voluntary	   belief	   and	   epistemic	   evaluation.	   	   In	   M.	   Steup	   (ed.)	  
Knowledg,	  Truth,	  and	  Duty	  (77-­‐92).	  	  New	  York:	  Oxford	  University	  Press.	  Frankish,	  K.	  (2007)	  Deciding	  to	  believe	  again.	  	  Mind,	  116,	  523-­‐47.	  Funkhouser,	   E.	   (2003)	  Willing	   belief	   and	   the	   norm	   of	   truth.	  Philosophical	   Studies,	  
115,	  179-­‐95.	  Garcia,	  J.	  (1990)	  The	  intentional	  and	  the	  intended.	  Erkenntnis,	  33,	  191-­‐209.	  Ginet,	   C.	   (2001)	  Deciding	   to	   believe.	   	   In	  M.	   Steup	   (ed.)	  Knowledge,	   truth,	   and	  duty	  (pp.	  63-­‐76).	  	  New	  York:	  Oxford	  University	  Press.	  Govier,	  T.	  (1975)	  Beliefs,	  values,	  and	  the	  will.	  Dialogue,	  15,	  642-­‐63.	  Hawthorne,	  J.	  (2004)	  Knowledge	  and	  lotteries.	  	  New	  York:	  Oxford	  University	  Press.	  Hieronymi,	  P.	  (2006)	  Controlling	  attitudes.	  Pacific	  Philosophical	  Quarterly,	  87,	  45-­‐74.	  Jones,	  W.	  (2002)	  Explaining	  our	  own	  beliefs:	  Non-­‐epistemic	  believing	  and	  doxastic	  instability.	  	  Philosophical	  Studies,	  111,	  217-­‐49.	  Jones,	  W.	  (2004)	  Pragmatic	  believing	  and	  its	  explanation.	  Critíca,	  36,	  3-­‐36.	  McCann,	  H.	  (1998)	  The	  works	  of	  agency:	  on	  human	  action,	  will,	  and	  freedom.	  Ithaca:	  Cornell	  University	  Press.	  McCormick,	  T.	   (2011)	  Taking	   control	  of	  belief.	  Philosophical	  Explorations,	   14,	  169-­‐183.	  	  McHugh,	   C.	   (forthcoming)	   Exercising	   doxastic	   freedom.	   Philosophy	   and	  
Phenomenological	  Research.	  
  30 
Mele,	   A.	   (1992)	   Springs	   of	   Action:	   Understanding	   Intentional	   Behavior.	   New	   York:	  Oxford	  University	  Press.	  Mele,	  A.	  (2001)	  Self-­‐deception	  unmasked.	  Princeton,	  NJ:	  Princeton	  University	  Press.	  Mele,	  A.	  (2003)	  Motivation	  and	  agency.	  	  New	  York:	  Oxford	  University	  Press.	  Nisbett,	   R.	   and	   Ross,	   L.	   (1980)	   Human	   inference:	   Strategies	   and	   shortcomings.	  	  Englewood	  Cliffs,	  NJ:	  Prentice	  Hall.	  	  Nottelmann,	   N.	   (2006)	   The	   analogy	   argument	   for	   doxastic	   voluntarism.	  	  
Philosophical	  Studies,	  131,	  559-­‐82.	  O’Brien,	   L.	   and	   Soteriou,	   M.	   (eds.)	   (2009)	   Mental	   action.	   New	   York:	   Oxford	  University	  Press.	  O’Shaugnessy,	  B.	  (1980).	  The	  will,	  volume	  1.	  New	  York:	  Cambridge	  University	  Press.	  Owens,	   D.	   (2000)	   Reason	   without	   freedom:	   The	   problem	   of	   epistemic	   normativity.	  	  London:	  Routledge.	  Pieper,	  L.	  (1997)	  Self-­‐knowledge	  in	  “Deciding	  to	  believe”.	  Dialogue,	  36,	  493-­‐510.	  Pojman,	  L.	  (1985)	  Believing	  and	  willing.	  Canadian	  Journal	  of	  Philosophy,	  15,	  37-­‐55.	  Radcliffe,	   D.	   (1997)	   Scott-­‐Kakures	   on	   believing	   at	   will.	   Philosophy	   and	  
Phenomenological	  Research,	  57,	  145-­‐51.	  	  	  Reed,	  B.	  (2010)	  A	  defense	  of	  stable	  invariantism.	  	  Noûs,	  44,	  224-­‐44.	  Ryan,	  S.	  (2003)	  Doxastic	  compatibilism	  and	  the	  ethics	  of	  belief.	  Philosophical	  Studies,	  
114,	  47-­‐79.	  Scott-­‐Kakures,	   D.	   (1994)	   On	   belief	   and	   the	   captivity	   of	   the	   will.	   	   Philosophy	   and	  
Phenomenological	  Research,	  54,	  77-­‐103.	  
  31 
Searle,	   J.	   (1983)	   Intentionality:	   An	   essay	   in	   the	   philosophy	   of	   mind.	   	   New	   York:	  Cambridge	  University	  Press.	  Setiya,	  K.	  (2008)	  Believing	  at	  will.	  	  Midwest	  Studies	  in	  Philosophy,	  32,	  36-­‐52.	  Shah,	  N.	  (2003)	  How	  truth	  governs	  belief.	  	  Philosophical	  Review,	  112,	  447-­‐82.	  	  Shah,	  N.	  (2006)	  A	  new	  argument	  for	  evidentialism.	  The	  Philosophical	  Quarterly,	  56,	  481-­‐98.	  Stanley,	   J.	   (2005)	  Knowledge	  and	  practical	   interests.	   	  New	  York:	  Oxford	  University	  Press.	  Steup,	  M.	  (2000)	  Doxastic	  voluntarism	  and	  epistemic	  deontology.	  	  Acta	  Analytica,	  15,	  25-­‐56.	  Steup,	  M.	  (2008)	  Doxastic	  freedom.	  Synthese,	  161,	  375-­‐392.	  Stone,	   T.	   and	   Young,	   A.	   (1997)	   Delusions	   and	   brain	   injury:	   the	   philosophy	   and	  psychology	  of	  belief.	  	  Mind	  and	  Language,	  12,	  327-­‐64.	  	  Velleman,	  J.D.	  (2000)	  On	  the	  aim	  of	  belief.	  	  In	  The	  possibility	  of	  practical	  reason	  (pp.	  244-­‐81).	  	  New	  York:	  Oxford	  University	  Press.	  Williams,	  B.	  (1973)	  Deciding	  to	  believe.	  	  In	  Problems	  of	  the	  Self	  (pp.	  136-­‐151).	  New	  York:	  Cambridge	  University	  Press.	  	  	  Winters,	  B.	  (1979)	  Believing	  at	  will.	  Journal	  of	  Philosophy,	  76,	  243-­‐56.	  	  
